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As part of our celebration of thirty years of clinical education 
at William Mitchell College of Law, I want to describe three clinical 
courses that I’ve had a hand in developing and teaching.  When I 
joined the William Mitchell faculty in 1984, the clinical program 
was in full bloom, vigorous, and diverse.1  The courses I discuss in 
this short essay have grown out of that fertile and energetic
educational environment.
While the main focus of my essay is to describe these courses, I 
also take the opportunity to reflect very briefly on the William 
Mitchell educational philosophy out of which they have grown, and 
of which they form a part.  As I see it, William Mitchell’s approach 
to legal education flows from three main founts.  First, there is an 
embrace of the profession, combined with the critical stance that 
should characterize higher education.2  William Mitchell is proud 
to be a professional school, helping students learn not just theory, 
* Thanks to Sam Magavern, Gena Berglund, Heather Rastorfer Vlieger, and 
Carolyn Chalmers for their valuable help and comments on this essay, and to 
Robin Vue-Benson for his skillful editing and cite checking.
† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
1. See Roger S. Haydock, Clinical Legal Education: The History and Development 
of a Law Clinic, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 101 (1983).
2. See generally Robert J. Condlin, “Tastes Great, Less Filling”: The Law School 
Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986).
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but a practice—a complex, nuanced, and messy subset of real life.3
Second, William Mitchell’s education has incorporated a focus 
on values.  In some ways, clinical education can take the lead in 
values education, but at William Mitchell, we’ve worked to include 
attention to values throughout our curriculum.  But how one might 
teach about values is not self-evident, so our approaches to values-
education have been diverse, and the courses I describe are part of 
an institutional ethos that encourages experimentation and
initiative in developing approaches to teaching.
The third characteristic is the school’s history of putting
pedagogy on the same plane as scholarship. Teaching and writing 
are the two ways in which law school professors construct and 
disseminate knowledge. Our respect for teaching manifests the 
high regard we have for our students, for the profession they are 
learning, and for the clients they will eventually represent.
Thinking about how to structure teaching to support our 
educational goals regarding the profession and values has led me 
to think a lot about the idea of perspective.  Typical law school 
teaching shines a spotlight on a particular, analytically distinct area 
of legal doctrine or theory—for example, contracts or torts.  This 
“content” is taught by studying pieces of judges’ (and lawyers’) 
work—often appellate opinions.
Much clinical education—including the courses I am about to 
describe—changes this typical pedagogical structure in two ways.
First, it reverses foreground and background, so that the focus is 
now on what lawyers do rather than what law is.  Second, clinical 
education shifts from the analytical stance to an approach that is 
integrative, which helps students connect the analytically separate 
pieces of their legal education together into a meaningful whole.4
As the reader will see, all three of the courses discussed below 
were developed collaboratively, are taught collaboratively, and use 
collaboration as a tool for learning.  This, too, is a conscious choice 
3. See generally DONALD SCHÖN, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER:
TOWARDS A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987).
See also Michael Jordan, Law Teachers And The Educational Continuum, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L. J. 41, 57 (1996) (critiquing contemporary legal education as
“training and thinking [that] engenders a hierarchical view of how knowledge is 
created and should be valued” and places the researcher/theoretician “[a]t the 
pinnacle of the hierarchy”).
4. This process is more fully described in Eric S. Janus, Clinics and
“Contextual Integration”: Helping Law Students Put the Pieces Back Together Again, 16 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 463 (1990).
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about pedagogy, about values, and about lawyering.  It represents 
an application of pedagogical knowledge about adult learning and 
models a way of approaching the practice of law and relationships 
with clients.
I. CONSTRUCTING THE WHOLE: THE WORK OF THE LAWYER COURSE
I began practicing law in 1973, eleven years before I started 
teaching.  As a new lawyer at Minneapolis Legal Aid, I quickly 
confirmed that my law school education was just the beginning of 
my legal education.  In part, I was reassured because law school had 
provided me with the doctrinal framework and analytical skills to 
support lots of on-the-job learning.  But something was strikingly 
absent.  It slowly dawned on me that I did not have a coherent idea
of what it meant to be in a lawyer-client relationship.  It was not so 
much that I felt unprepared for the inevitable ethical dilemmas, 
but rather that the everyday relationship of lawyer and client 
seemed often problematic and unstable.5
In fact, this peculiar relationship had rarely been taught, or 
even taught about, in law school.6  Nonetheless, I had two very strong 
paradigms in my head.  In one I was to be the agent for the client, 
advocating vigorously for his or her viewpoint or position, whether 
it was prudent or not.  In the other image, I was to be the 
independent professional, firmly in control of the relationship with 
my client and the direction of the representation.
These two images of the lawyer-client relationship were
inconsistent with each other, but little in my legal education had 
prepared me for facing this incongruity.  I had no framework for 
thinking about it, learning about it from practice, or developing a 
nuanced and (hopefully) authentic accommodation or synthesis of 
these inconsistent images of the work of the lawyer.  Equally 
puzzling was the fact that I had such strong images of lawyering, 
despite the fact that little about this topic had been taught
5. See Eric S. Janus, A Memorial to Bernie Becker, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 409
(1991).
6. The closest my legal education came to addressing these issues was the 
wonderful and innovative Lawyering Process course, taught by the late Prof. Gary 
Bellow. Prof. Bellow later published the materials for this course in a text of the 
same name, co-authored by Prof. Bea Moulton.  I used their text when I taught as 
an adjunct instructor in Hamline Law School’s Lawyering Process course, led by 
Prof. David Cobin in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In many ways, Bellow’s 
teaching, and Bellow and Moulton’s text, were a model and inspiration for the 
Work of the Lawyer course.
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explicitly in law school.
I came to William Mitchell to teach and help with the clinical 
program in the fall of 1984.  I began to think about how we might 
be able to prepare our students better than I had been prepared on 
this question of what it meant to be a lawyer.  There was talk at that 
time among law professors about bringing values into legal
education.  A colleague, Neil Hamilton, had developed a seminar 
on business ethics in which students were asked to reflect on their 
own values. This focus dovetailed with my thinking about the work 
of the lawyer.  It was not simply that the two stereotypical roles for 
lawyers were incongruous, it was also that neither one really had 
room for the lawyer as a person—a person with her own values, 
style, and temperament.  Neil and I melded our two ideas and 
developed the Work of the Lawyer Seminar, first offered to
students in about 1989 and still offered as part of the William 
Mitchell curriculum in 2003.
The course seeks to help students understand—and choose—
an approach to being a lawyer that corresponds to their own values.
As a means to this end, it adopts a pedagogy that brings to the fore 
the work of the lawyer and seeks to combine theory, practice, and a 
focus on values.
The course has three components.  In the “academic”
component, students read a variety of materials about being a 
lawyer.  Topics covered include: the nature of the lawyer-client
relationship, lawyering and honesty, the relationship between one’s 
personal and professional values, meaning and work, the impact of 
race and gender on law and lawyering, lawyering and the public 
interest, and the meaning of “professionalism” and being part of a 
“profession.”  The second component is a “field” component.
Students are placed with practicing lawyers, with the goal of having 
students observe and participate in as many lawyering activities as 
possible.  Especially emphasized is the hidden work of lawyers—the
behind-the-scenes work with their clients, colleagues, and
professional peers.  Students are to keep journals of their
experiences and observations. The third component is a “value” 
component.  The course is designed to bring the students’ own 
values into the picture.  They each write a “credo” describing their 
own fundamental values, and are encouraged to think about how 
those values might fit most authentically with the various models 
for lawyers’ work that they see in the course.  All three aspects are 
brought together in the seminar meetings.  Working from the 
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topics and materials supplied by the professor, these sessions are 
planned and run by pre-arranged groups of students.  In this way, 
students are encouraged in their transition from student to lawyer 
by taking responsibility for their own learning and for choosing the 
kind of lawyer they want to be.
II. LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: USING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN TWO
PROFESSIONS TO SEE LAWYERING MORE CLEARLY
In 1999, Dr. Tom Stapleton, who taught forensic psychiatry to 
psychiatric residents at the University of Minnesota Medical School,
approached William Mitchell Professor John Sonsteng with a
proposal to collaborate on a forensic psychiatry clinic.  Because of 
my interest in mental health law, I became involved a few months 
later, when the basic outlines of this collaboration between the two 
institutions was in its infancy.  The challenge presented was
integrating two different professional cultures and approaches, 
both in terms of practice and in terms of pedagogy.
The evolution of the structure for the Law and Psychiatry 
Clinic is a good example of the kind of mindfulness about teaching 
that I described in the introduction to this essay.  Our initial 
approach was to simply stitch together a law clinic and a psychiatric 
clinic.  Under this model, the two professions would work in 
parallel: practicing lawyers would refer clients who needed forensic 
psychiatry evaluations, law students would work as law clerks with 
the referring lawyers, and psychiatric residents would perform 
evaluations of the referred client under the supervision of the
psychiatric faculty.  Law students and medical residents might meet 
together in class to discuss the cases, but their professional
identifications and loyalties would be separate: law students would 
be doing law and psychiatry residents would be doing psychiatry.
Undoubtedly, this arrangement would have provided an
adequate educational experience.  The basic outlines of forensic 
practice would have been clarified.  The psychiatric residents would 
have had practice doing forensic evaluations and the law students
might have observed and assisted as a lawyer coped with a
psychiatrist’s expert testimony.  In addition, by maintaining parallel 
and separate professional identities, this model avoided the
complicating issues of multidisciplinary practice.7
7. See Eric S. Janus & Maureen Hackett, Establishing a Law and Psychiatry 
Clinic, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming fall 2003) (discussing the ethical 
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But as we thought more about the educational goals of the 
clinic, we understood that the real value of an interdisciplinary 
clinic lay in seeing the border of the two professions—the area
where the interchange or translation from medicine to law, and 
vice versa—takes place.  We understood that the central issue for 
both psychiatrists and lawyers lies at this intersection.  It is here that 
the enormous power exercised by psychiatry in law gets formed and 
negotiated. This insight suggested that we needed to think more 
about how to structure the course and focus our teaching to 
support our educational goals.
Courts delegate central judgments of social policy to forensic 
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals perhaps more 
than they do to other expert witnesses.  Questions of
dangerousness, competence, and responsibility are often placed 
almost wholly in the hands of these mental health professionals 
(MHPs).  To be sure, judges and juries retain the final say, but 
MHPs exercise great power in the adjudication process.  Because 
that power is often obscured by the opacity of “expertise,”8 the legal 
process often lacks the ability to tether professional opinions to the 
rule of law.
Psychiatrists and lawyers often attempt to deal with the power 
of forensic psychiatry by asserting that as expert witnesses,
complications of joining law and psychiatry students in a single clinic); J. Michael 
Norwood & Alan Paterson, Problem-Solving in a Multidisciplinary Environment? Must 
Ethics Get in the Way of Holistic Services?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 337  (2002) (discussing 
the ethical complications of multidisciplinary clinical education).
8. Mental health professionals’ power arises from at least three attributes of 
their testimony.  First, their judgments come from an expertise that is often 
characterized as more art than science.  This characterization excuses psychiatric 
judgments from the justification required of scientific testimony, and often places 
it beyond the accountability of effective courtroom advocacy.  Second, MHPs, 
often sub rosa, are delegated (or unilaterally assume) the power to set the 
boundary or threshold for vague but important legal concepts.  Thus, when the 
question is “dangerousness,” courts often want the experts to make the judgment 
whether the risk posed by an individual is so severe that his or her liberty ought to 
be constrained. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, The Forensic Use of Actuarial
Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders:  Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 39 AM.
CRIM. L. REV.__ (forthcoming). Third, MHPs can tell stories (narratives) about 
clients’ lives.  These narratives, couched in the expertise and mystique of
psychiatry, can have a particular authority.  An additional source of power, as 
Michael Perlin points out, is the “near total capitulation to experts” that often 
characterizes attorneys working with patients with mental illness. Michael L.
Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers And Crooks”: Sanism In Clinical Teaching, 9 
CLINICAL. L. REV. 683, 689 (2003).
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psychiatrists have an obligation to seek “objectivity.”9  Yet, as
explained in more detail elsewhere, the goal of objectivity, even if 
well-executed, cannot determine critical parts of the MHP’s
opinion.10  This is because, as mentioned above, a significant part of 
the MHP’s work involves highly value-laden ascriptions, implicitly 
setting thresholds and contours for concepts like dangerousness, 
competence, and responsibility.  Further, the work of MHPs often 
involves creating a narrative explanation for the behavior of the 
client.11  Both the ascription and narration are constrained, to be 
sure, by the “objective” facts, but neither is fully determined.  Thus, 
a key part of the course is helping both the residents and the law 
students come to a working understanding of the ways in which 
MHPs discover—and construct—the evaluative picture they paint 
of the client.
To show our students how this work is done, we wanted to get 
the residents and law students together, working and thinking—
each from their own professional perspectives—on the common 
problem of work at the boundary of their professions.  In order to 
accomplish this goal, we felt that the law students and the
psychiatry residents needed to be “on the same team.”  That is, 
instead of working on parallel professional tracks, we wanted them 
to be working together within a single professional framework.
This would allow them to fully share their thinking about each case, 
unconstrained by the limits that distinct professional roles and 
rules might otherwise impose.
This led us to change our notion of the clinic.  We decided 
that the law students would be a part of a psychiatric clinic, working 
under the auspices of the doctors’ licenses.  Of course, this meant 
that the law students would not be working under a lawyer’s 
9. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR 
THE PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY, available at http://www.emory.edu/AAPL/
ethics.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2003) (noting the “special hazards” presented by 
the adversarial system, exposing “the forensic psychiatrist to the potential for 
unintended bias and the danger of distortion of their opinion”).
10. See Janus & Hackett, supra note 7.
11. Christopher Slobogin, Doubts About Daubert: Psychiatric Anecdata as a Case 
Study, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919, 922-23, 922 n.23 (2000) (describing forensic 
mental health evaluations as potentially giving “voice” to clients); see also Martha 
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased 
Prototypes,  74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 781 (2001) (discussing the power of prototypical 
narratives in which “a ‘code’ provided by the script tells us why the actors behaved 
as they did . . . . [T]he complexity of the actor’s actual motivations is eclipsed by 
the simpler cultural meaning, which emphasizes character traits.”).
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license, and hence would not be involved in practicing law.  But the 
advantage achieved from the shift in perspective was clear.
Working as law clerks, the law students would have remained 
outside of the law-psychiatry border.  They would have had the 
same view of psychiatrists as lawyers usually get: from the outside in.
By moving the law students under the psychiatrists’ umbrella, we 
changed this perspective, giving the law students an insider’s 
perspective that they would never get in practice.  In addition, we 
would change the view of the psychiatric residents.  By working with 
the law students and professors, the psychiatrists would become 
more mindful of their own processes, and of the ways in which the 
law frames the issues for and uses the opinions resulting from 
psychiatric evaluations.
Our thinking about educational goals thus shaped the
structure and pedagogy of our multidisciplinary clinic.  Instead of 
two professions working in parallel, we integrated the work so we 
could focus on their boundary.  As time has passed, we have 
continued to build on the benefits of this integrated structure in 
two additional ways.  First, we require cross-disciplinary
collaboration by giving primary responsibility for each case to a 
team made up of two law students and a psychiatric resident.
These teams work together to marshal the documentary
background and begin to frame the legal questions that must be
addressed by the evaluation.  We have found that creating these 
interdisciplinary teams helps break down the barriers between the 
two professional groups in the clinic.
The second way in which we hope to maximize our gain from 
the interdisciplinary character of the clinic is through the use of a 
centralized rather than distributed approach to the activities of the 
clinic.  In a distributed approach, much of the work of the clinic is 
done outside of the classroom setting by students working alone or 
directly with a supervising attorney.  Students and instructors meet 
together in a seminar periodically for instruction, to reflect on the 
work they’ve done outside of class and, sometimes, to actually do 
some of the lawyering work (e.g., planning and strategizing).
In our centralized model, by contrast, most of the work of the 
clinic is done during long weekly meetings where all members of 
the clinic come together.  It is in those meetings that we parse the 
legal issues and develop goals for the evaluations, perform (and 
observe, via closed circuit television) the evaluation interviews, and 
distill the information to form professional forensic opinions.
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Though our centralized method is no doubt less efficient, it 
has the advantage that all members of the clinic observe and 
participate in all aspects of the development of a forensic
evaluation.  It is in these interchanges and discussions that the 
insider’s view of forensic psychiatry resides.  During our meetings, 
we all participate in, and observe, expert opinions being formed.
We give special attention to the role assumed by psychiatrists in the 
forensic setting.  Alluded to above, this forensic role involves a 
transformation for the residents.  They must change their normal 
professional instincts, which lead them to act as therapeutic healer 
for their patients.  The new role involves no therapy or healing, 
and mandates not only honesty and fairness, but also “objectivity.” 
Quite often, the legal actions resulting from this new role are anti-
therapeutic for the patient, as the forensic psychiatrist focuses on 
issues such as risk to others who might come into contact with the 
patient.
But the shift in role is more complex than simply adopting a 
stance of “objectivity” and shedding the therapeutic approach.  As 
mentioned above, it turns out that the commands to seek
objectivity and honesty are, by themselves, insufficiently
determinate.  Honesty and objectivity cannot provide complete 
guidance to the witness, or the attorney, in the formulation of key 
aspects of the expert opinion, the ascription of value-laden labels, 
and the formulation of narrative.  By structuring the work of the 
clinic so that the participants’ attention is drawn to the
indeterminacy of these values, we give both law students and 
psychiatric residents practice in exercising, and critically reflecting 
on, the power that is too often hidden by the mystique of expertise.
III. EQUAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
An important strength of the legal profession and legal
education in Minnesota has been their long-term, collaborative 
focus on public service.  The robust collaboration between the 
private bar and the legal services community dates back at least to 
the 1980s.12  The joint work between the bar and the law schools 
12. See generally Angela McCaffrey, Pro Bono in Minnesota: A History of
Volunteerism in the Delivery of Civil Legal Services to Low Income Clients, 13 LAW & INEQ.
77 (1994).  Jerry Lane, executive director of Mid-Minnesota Legal Services, reports 
that the collaboration among the bar, legal aid, and legal education dates back at 
least to 1914, when the University of Minnesota Law School required every third-
year student to spend time at Legal Aid before graduating.  Lane also reports on a 
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began in earnest in the early 1990s, and is documented in a 
symposium issue of the Journal of Law and Inequality13 and in Susan 
Curry’s article, Meeting The Need: Minnesota’s Collaborative Model To 
Deliver Law Student Public Service.14  Throughout, the bar and the law 
schools have worked together to seek ways in which the values of 
pro bono and public service could be made real in the legal 
education setting.  Key developments in this collaboration have 
been the Law School Public Service program,15 a project to design 
curricular modules on poverty law for first-year law school classes,16
and the Public Interest Speakers Directory listing public interest 
lawyers who are willing to speak in law school classrooms.17
In 2001, another initiative emerged from this collaboration, 
Legal Scholarship for Equal Justice (LSEJ).18  As announced by the 
LSEJ Committee, the purpose of this initiative is to “encourage a 
wide variety of legal scholarship that has practical results for
disadvantaged individuals including law review articles and notes, 
independent research projects, term papers, amicus briefs, and 
draft legislation.”19
1937 letter from the Hennepin County Bar Association President to Minneapolis
Legal Aid, “saying it was his impression ‘that generally the lawyers not only accept 
but approve the work that the Legal Aid Society is doing,’ and expressing his wish 
to cooperate in every way possible.” E-mail from Jerry Lane, Executive Director, 
Mid-Minnesota Legal Services, to Eric Janus (May 13, 2003) (on file with author).
13. See, e.g., Stephen Befort & Eric S. Janus, The Role of Legal Education in 
Instilling an Ethos of Public Service Among Law Students: Towards a Collaboration 
Between the Profession and the Academy on Professional Values, 13 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1994) 
(and symposium articles referred to therein).
14. 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 347 (2001).
15. Id.; see also MINNESOTA JUSTICE FOUNDATION, THE LAW SCHOOL PUBLIC
SERVICE PROGRAM, at http://www.mnjustice.org/students_lspsp.asp (last visited
Aug. 16, 2003) (describing collaboration among Minnesota Justice Foundation, 
the three then-existing Minnesota law schools, the Minnesota State Bar
Association, and “over forty legal services providers”).
16. These materials, created by Professors Peter Knapp, Mike Steenson, and 
Roger Haydock of William Mitchell College of Law, and Professor Marie Failinger 
of Hamline University Law School, are posted on the TWEN Website, at
http://lawschool.westlaw.com/twen/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2003); see also The West 
Education Network Announces Law School Lesson Plans on Poverty Law, 20 No. 1 
LAWYER’S PC 9 (2002).
17. E-mail from Heather Rastorfer Vlieger, staff attorney, Minnesota Justice 
Foundation, to Eric Janus (May 2, 2003) (on file with author).
18. See MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
DISADVANTAGED COMMITTEE, ANNUAL REPORT, 2001-2002, at http://www2.mnbar.
org/committees/lad/annual-archive.htm; see also Sam Magavern, Integrating
Scholarship, Teaching, and Service: How Four Law Professors Make It Work, BENCH & BAR
OF MINN., May-June 2002, at 27.
19. MINNESOTA LEGAL SERVICES, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, at
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The LSEJ Committee proposed a law school course aimed at 
this goal.  I volunteered to design and teach the first iteration of 
the course.  I had wonderful collaborators in Sam Magavern, a legal 
aid attorney who was one of the founders of LSEJ; Heather 
Rastorfer Vlieger, staff attorney for Minnesota Justice Foundation;
and two enthusiastic and dedicated law students, Melissa Giernoth 
and Gena Berglund.
We named the course Equal Justice: Advanced Research, and 
offered it for the first time in the fall of 2002.  It was open to 
students from all four local law schools, limited to twelve total.  The 
purpose of the class was to facilitate legal scholarship on legal issues 
of current concern to practitioners working for equal justice.
Befitting this work, we attempted to design the class to sit on the 
boundary between theory and practice.  Sam and Heather,
networking with equal justice practitioners throughout the state, 
lined up about two dozen legal issues of current concern.20  They 
made arrangements for the attorneys who proposed the issues or 
other experts to be involved in a field experience for students who 
chose to work on their topic, and later coordinated those field 
experiences.  Gena, Melissa, and I put together the syllabus and 
materials for the class.  The syllabus included materials and classes 
on how to do legal scholarship,21 the controversy about the
relevance of legal scholarship,22 an introduction to the various 
theories informing legal scholarship,23 an overview of theories of 
justice,24 approaches to public interest and poverty lawyering,25 and 
http://www.mnlegalservices.org/about/lsej/lsej.shtml#ej_asc (last visited Aug. 16,
2003).
20. See id. (listing each issue).
21. Eugene Volokh, Writing a Student Article, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1998).
22. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992); Deborah Rhode, Legal Scholarship,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (2002).
23. See, e.g., JURISPRUDENCE—CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL
LAW TO POSTMODERNISM (Robert L. Hayman, Jr., et al. eds., 2002).  Thanks to my 
colleague Prof. Russ Pannier for his help in selecting these materials.
24. THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Chapter 3 
(Robert Simon ed., 2002).
25. John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, 181-200 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 
1998); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor 
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Clark D.
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992); Lucie E. White, 
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. 
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the nature and origins of poverty.26 We also devoted several class 
sessions to reading “exemplars” of equal justice scholarship—legal
scholarship that had been influential in shaping the development 
of the law in the areas of equal justice—and attempting to
understand how these scholars translated their academic work into 
action.27
We viewed the course as having three parts.  Roughly speaking, 
the seminar focused on theory, which constituted the academic 
content.  Second, we expected the students to engage in a field 
component.  Guided by the attorneys who had proposed the 
research issues, the students were to do field research connected to 
their topics.  We encouraged the students to gather information 
not only from these lawyers, but also from policy makers,
government staff, service providers, community members, and, of 
course, people who were most affected by the legal issue—the
clients of equal justice lawyers.  This was a critical aspect of the 
course, because we wanted student work to be connected to the 
clients who inhabited the world from which the legal issues arose.
G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 19-32 (1990).  Thanks to my colleague Prof. Jay Krishnan 
for his help in finding and selecting these materials.
26. This class was taught by Phil Sandro, Ph.D., Director of the Metro Urban 
Studies Term of the Higher Education Consortium for Urban Affairs. See
http://www.hecua.org.
27. The exemplars included materials in the following areas:
Domestic violence: State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989); Michael
A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on 
Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359 (1984/1985); Victoria Mikesell Mather, The
Skeleton in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony,
39 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1988); Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense:
Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991).
Housing: Justin D. Cummins, Housing Matters: Why Our Communities Must Have 
Affordable Housing, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 197 (2001); Elizabeth K. Julian & 
Michael M. Daniel, Separate And Unequal: The Root and Branch of Public Housing 
Segregation, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 666 (1989).
Education: john powell, Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public 
Schools, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 337 (1996).
Death penalty: McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 285 n.2 (1987); David C. Baldus et 
al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience,
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); James Liebman, A Broken System: Error 
Rates in Capital Cases, at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/ (last
visited July 15, 2003).
Racial profiling: DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE  (2002); David A. Harris, 
“Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual 
Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).
Welfare rights: Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
Mental disability: Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499
(1960); Morton Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752 (1969).
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In addition, we wanted to encourage the students to include some 
empirical work in their research, again as a way of connecting the 
theoretical and practical.
The third component of the course was the writing
requirement.  This was to be the bridge between the academic and 
the real.  The goal was to produce scholarship aimed at making a 
difference on equal justice issues in the real world.  The product 
was to be a law review-style paper.  We also encouraged the students 
to prepare a “poster” presentation of their research for a
symposium on Legal Scholarship for Equal Justice that was to be 
held in January 2003.28
The course was offered for the first time, at William Mitchell, 
in the fall of 2002.  Twelve students enrolled (three from each of 
the four local law schools).  These students, working alone or in 
teams, chose six topics to work on, ranging from controversial 
legislation to recognize marriages solemnized in traditional Hmong 
marriage ceremonies, to a study of the downward spiral into
poverty that drivers license suspensions and associated fines can 
have on low-income persons.  The final papers, all of which
integrated theory, doctrine, empirical work, and client narratives, 
are posted on the Web.29
IV. REFLECTIONS
Looking back over these three initiatives, I want to offer three 
observations.
The first observation is about “values.”  All three of these 
classes are, at least in part, about values.  The Work of the Lawyer 
class is about how law students can take their own values and 
translate them into a template for working as a lawyer.  The Law 
and Psychiatry Clinic is about what it means to be “objective and 
honest” in an adversarial context.  And the Equal Justice class 
focuses on using one’s legal skills to advance equal justice.
The second observation is related to the first.  All three courses 
chose pedagogies and perspectives specifically in service to their 
educational goals, and, in particular, their goals for values-
28. First Annual Conference on Legal Scholarship for Equal Justice, January 
24, 2003, William Mitchell College of Law.  Prof. James Liebman of Columbia 
University School of Law was the keynote speaker.  His remarks appear elsewhere
in this volume. 
29. http://www.mnlegalservices.org/about/lsej/lsej.shtml#ej_asc (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2003).
JANUS READY TO PROOF.DOC 8/23/2003 2:36 PM
86 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:1
education.  These courses flipped the normal focus so that the 
background information about practicing law became the
foreground.  They intentionally positioned themselves at
boundaries, and consciously brought clients and empiricism into 
the classroom.
Finally, all three sought to integrate what otherwise would have 
been separate.  The Work of the Lawyer seeks to see the lawyer 
whole, rather than in the analytically separated pieces that are the 
normal subject matter in law school.  The Equal Justice course aims 
to integrate academic theory and writing skills with real-world
problems and real-world people and facts.  And the Law and 
Psychiatry clinic dissolves the normal barriers between the
professions of law and psychiatry, making visible the powerful 
processes of translation that occur at their boundary.
V. CONCLUSION
Providing a legal education that leads students to become 
ethically grounded lawyers—values education—is an important and 
difficult piece of legal education.  To do it ethically and effectively 
requires conscious attention to pedagogy and perspective.  The 
three courses discussed in this essay are attempts to provide
integrating experiences for students, employing teaching methods 
and perspectives that provide them with the expanded skills,
knowledge, and imagination to become the kinds of lawyers they 
want to be.
These courses are nurtured by the key principles that have 
shaped clinical education at William Mitchell.  They embrace the 
profession of law, but insist on a critical stance.  They recognize 
that values define the practice of law, and that only through 
intentional choice of pedagogy and perspective can values
education be effective and respectful of the autonomy of our 
students as they work to define the sort of lawyers they wish to 
become.
